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THE COURT OF CLAIMS-REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
E. MANNING SELTZER* AND JOHN H. RYAN**
Clauses providing for the finality of administrative determinations
of disputes between the government and one of its contractors have
been a part of government contracts for the better part of a century.
The current disputes clause for supply contracts' provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any
dispute concerning a question of fact arising under this con-
tract which is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided
by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision to
writing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the
Contractor. The decision of the Contracting Officer shall be
final and conclusive unless, within 30 days from the date of
receipt of such copy, the Contractor mails or otherwise fur-
nishes to the Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed
to the Secretary. The decision of the Secretary or his duly au-
thorized representative for the determination of such appeals
shall be final and conclusive unless determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, or capricious,
or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply
bad faith or not supported by substantial evidence. In con-
nection with any appeal proceeding under this clause, the
Contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to
offer evidence in support of its appeal. Pending final decision
of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall proceed dili-
gently with the performance of the contract and in accordance
with the Contracting Officer's decision.
(b) This "Disputes" clause does not preclude considera-
tion of law questions in connection with decisions provided for
* B.S., Villanova College, LL.B., Harvard University ; Member of the Pennsylvania
Bar; General Counsel, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army.
** A.B., LL.B., Boston College; Member of the Massachusetts Bar; Member of
the staff of the General Counsel, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Department of the
Army.
1 The clause used in the latest standard government construction contract form
has been modified to paraphrase the Wunderlich Act, 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. H 321,
322 (1958) as follows:
The decision of the head of the agency or his duly authorized representative
for the determination of such appeals shall be final and conclusive. This provi-
sion shall not be pleaded in any suit involving a question of fact arising under
this contract as limiting judicial review of any such decision to cases where fraud
by such official or his representatives or board is alleged; Provided, however,
that any such decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same is fraudulent
or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad
faith or is not supported by substantial evidence.
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in paragraph (a) above: provided, that nothing in this con-
tract shall be construed as making final the decision of any
administrative official, representative, or board on a question
of law.
In what is perhaps the earliest case involving a disputes clause,
Kihlberg v. United States,' the clause involved was limited to a final
determination of a single question of fact. In that case the parties
agreed that the chief quartermaster of the district of New Mexico
would ascertain and fix the distances upon which payment for the
transportation of government stores and supplies would be based.
Later clauses made the administrative decision final not only on
questions of fact, but on all disputes concerning questions arising under
the contract.' Clauses providing for appeals to the head of the depart-
ment from an adverse decision of the contracting officer appear in con-
tracts as early as 1912. 4
Although government contracts may have provided for finality of
administrative determinations, contractors were not thereby precluded
from going to the courts for a further adjudication of their claims
after an adverse administrative decision. Since many, if not most, of the
claims are within the exclusive cognizance of the Court of Claims,'
we should look principally to the decisions of that court to ascertain
what finality has been accorded administrative determinations upon
judicial review.
Although the Supreme Court, in Kihlberg v. United States' and
in a subsequent case,' stated that an administrative determination of
a question of fact would be final and conclusive in the absence of fraud
or such gross mistake as would necessarily imply bad faith or a failure
to exercise an honest judgment, the Court of Claims did not take such
a restricted view of its authority to review such administrative deter-
minations. The court came to hold that, if the determination were
arbitrary, capricious or so grossly erroneous as to imply bad faith,'
it could not stand and that, where a ruling was not supported by sub-
stantial evidence, it must be treated as having been arbitrary, capri-
cious, or so grossly erroneous as to imply bad faith .° Moreover, in cases
2 97 U.S. 398 (1878).
3 Bein v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 144 (1943).
4 Plumley v. United States, 226 U.S. 545 (1913).
5 For claims exceeding $10,000, the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction. For
claims not exceeding $10,000 the Court of Claims and the United States District Court
have concurrent jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1958).
6 Supra note 2.
7 Sweeney v. United States, 109 U.S. 618 (1883).
8 Needles v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 535 (1944) ; Penner Installation Corp. v.
United States, 116 Ct. Cl. 550, 89 F. Supp. 545, aff'd per curiam, 340 U.S. 898 (1950).
9 Wagner, Whirler & Derrick Corp. v. United States, 128 Ct. Cl. 382, 121 F. Supp.
664 (1954).
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involving claims for delays caused by the government the court re-
fused to accord any finality to administrative decisions on questions
of fact incident thereto, since the claims were for damages for breach
of contract and any dispute thereon was not one arising under the con-
tract.' The court further took the position that the parties could not
agree that any administrative determination would be final on ques-
tions of law, since such an agreement would be contrary to the law
conferring jurisdiction in this area on the Court of Claims."
Such was the status of the decisions of the Court of Claims when
the Supreme Court rendered its decisions, first in United States v.
Moorman,' and then in United States v. Wunderlich." In Moorman
the Supreme Court sustained the validity of a clause providing for
finality of an administration determination of a question of law. In
Wunderlich the Supreme Court put an end, at least temporarily, to the
liberal review by the Court of Claims of administrative determinations
of questions of fact. The finality of such an administrative determina-
tion, the Court said, would have to be upheld unless it was founded
on fraud, alleged and proved. Fraud alone was the exception to finality.
Accordingly, at this juncture, absent fraud, an administrative deter-
mination of questions of fact and law would, under an appropriate con-
tract clause, have to be treated by the Court of Claims as final."
The limited scope of review established by the Wunderlich de-
cision and the validity of a finality provision on questions of law under
Moorman were not to last for long. In May 1954, Congress, heeding
voices particularly from industry, enacted legislation primarily in-
tended to overcome the effect of the Wunderlich decision and inci-
dentally having that effect upon Moorman. The Act provided:
No provision of any contract entered into by the United
States, relating to the finality or conclusiveness of any de-
cision of the head of any department or agency or his duly
authorized representative or board in a dispute involving a
question arising under such contract, shall be pleaded in any
suit now filed or to be filed as limiting judicial review of any
such decision to cases where fraud by such official or his said
representative or board is alleged: Provided, however, That
any such decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same
111 Langevin v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 15 (1943); Silberblatt & Lasker, Inc. v.
United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 54 (1944).
11 Beuttas v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 748 (1944). The decision was reversed
in part by the Supreme Court sub nom. B-W Constr. Co. v. United States, 324 U.S.
768 (1945), without any decision on this contention.
12 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
13 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
14 The Court of Claims was quick to apply this standard to question of fact in
Palace Corp. v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 545, 110 F. Supp. 476 (1953).
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is fradulent [sic] or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly er-
roneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported
by substantial evidence."
No Government contract shall contain a provision making
final on a question of law the decision of any administrative
official, representative, or board."
The Act was drawn by Congress with a threefold purpose!? The
principal change to be effected was to restore the standards of review
based on capriciousness and arbitrariness. Secondly, the Act added the
additional standard that administrative determinations of questions
of fact must be supported by substantial evidence. It was hoped that
the inclusion of this standard would correct inadequacies in appellate
procedures under the disputes clause in the various departments and
agencies and give rise to records of hearing officers which would contain
all the testimony and evidence which had entered into their decision.
Lastly, it prohibited the inclusion in a government contract of a provi-
sion making final a decision of a contracting officer on a question of
law. Thus the "all disputes clause" could no longer be inserted in
government contracts.
The Wunderlich Act, it appeared, established the kind of ad-
ministrative determination which would be accorded finality and the
standards which would be applied upon a judicial review. It also ap-
peared to have prescribed that judicial review would be limited to a
consideration of the administrative record where the contractor alleged
arbitrariness, capriciousness or a failure of substantial evidence. This
last matter was not in issue in the Wunderlich case.
The Court of Claims after the Wunderlich Act followed a dual
approach in considering cases which had been decided adversely to
the contractor by the administrative agency or department. Each case
is examined in the first instance to determine if the ultimate issue in-
volved in the administrative decision concerns a question of fact or
one of law. The fact that the Court of Claims has recognized that such
a distinction is difficult to make in many cases' s
 has not caused it to
hesitate in following such approach. Where it decides that the ultimate
issue in the case is a question of law, such as the interpretation of a
contract or of a specification," the Court of Claims does not consider
18 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. 321 (1958).
ta 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. 322 (1958).
17 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 2194-95 (1954).
18 River Constr. Corp. v. United States, Ct. CI. No. 13-56 (Nov. 7, 1962). In some
instances the basis for placing a decision in one category rather than in another is difficult
to perceive. See Spector, Wile Co. v. United States and Associated Traders, Inc. v.
United States, 19 Fed. B.J. 212 (1959).
18 Callahan Constr. Co. v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 538 (1940) ; Union Paving Co.
v. United States, 126 Ct. CI. 478, 115 F. Supp. 179 (1953) ; Associated Traders, Inc. v.
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that it is required to give any heed to the administrative record regard-
less of the sometimes extensive findings of fact appearing in that
record."
On the other hand, the Court of Claims has held administrative
determinations of fact, where the ultimate issue was a question of fact,
to be final unless they failed to meet the Wunderlich Act standards
upon its review. The Court of Claims, however, in its review did not
restrict itself to the administrative record, but considered that it should
base its decision on evidence received at a trial de novo before that
court." This view was not generally shared by United States Circuit
and District Courts which, after the Wunderlich Act, limited their
review to a consideration of the administrative record." A resolution
of these widely divergent approaches was finally made by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Bianchi.23 Bianchi, a contractor for the
Corps of Engineers, submitted a claim to the contracting officer for
extra compensation for installing permanent protection throughout a
tunnel. Such protection was not required by the contract, but unfore-
seen conditions created extreme hazards for workmen and made such
installation necessary. The contract contained a changed conditions and
a disputes clause. The claim was denied by the contracting officer and
his decision was affirmed on appeal by the Board of Claims and Appeals
of the Corps of Engineers. Almost six years after the adverse Board
decision, the contractor filed suit in the Court of Claims alleging that
the decisions of the contracting officer and the Board were capricious,
arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith or
were not supported by substantial evidence. Over objections of the
government, the Commissioner of the court heard evidence de novo,24
made extensive findings of fact and concluded that the contractor was
United States, 144 Ct. CI. 744, 169 F. Supp. 502 (1959) ; Edwards Eng'r Corp. v. United
States, Ct. Cl. No. 218-59 (April 15, 1963). For a similar view by the United States
Court of Appeals, see Blake Constr. Co. v. United States, 296 F.2d 393 (D.C. Cir.
1961); Kayfield Constr. Corp. v. United States, 278 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1960).
20 A categorical division of questions into those purely of law and those purely of
fact would ignore realities. See Birnbaum, Questions of Law and Fact and the Jurisdic-
tion of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 19 Fed. B.J. 120 (1959). It does
not appear that the•Court of Claims would deny that most questions are mixed questions
of law and fact. Their concern is whether the ultimate issue is a question of law or fact.
21 Volentine & Littleton v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 638, 145 F. Supp. 952
(1956) ; Fehlhaber Corp. v. United States, 138 Ct. Cl. 571, 151 F. Supp. 817, cert. denied,
355 U.S. 877 (1957). In P.L.S. Coat & Suit Corp. v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 296, 180
F. Supp. 400 (1960), the Court of Claims seems to deviate somewhat from this
position.
22 Wells Sz Wells, Inc. v. United States, 269 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1959); West
Lumber Sales v United States, 270 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1959); Mann Chemical Labs., Inc.
v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 563 (D. Mass. 1958); Langoma Lumber Corp. v. United
States, 140 F. Supp. 460 (Ell Pa. 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 886 (3d Cir. 1956).
23 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
24 At the hearing before the Engineer Board the contractor presented 4 witnesses;
before the Commissioner he presented 15 witnesses.
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entitled to recover. The court accepted the Commissioner's findings
and ruled that, on consideration of all the evidence, the contracting
officer's decision as affirmed by the Board could not be said to have
substantial support and thus did not have finality. The court received
additional evidence to establish the amount of the contractor's
recovery.
The Supreme Court, emphasizing that it had only one issue
before it, held that, apart from the questions of fraud, determination
of the finality to be attached to a departmental decision on a question
arising under a disputes clause must rest solely on consideration of the
record before the department.25
The first case involving the applicability of Bianchi was soon
forthcoming in the Court of Claims in Stein Bros. Mfg. Co. v. United
States.26
 At the hearing before the Commissioner evidence which was
not before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals was in-
troduced, without objection, by both the government and the con-
tractor. The court held that the Wunderlich Act standard, as inter-
preted by Bianchi, is a rule of evidence or procedure and is waived, as
it was in this case, if not objected to by the party who is benefited by it.
The court rejected the government's argument that the court is without
jurisdiction to hear new evidence. The court went on to hold that it
could decide the amount of damages on evidence to be introduced
before the court and that it need not remand the case to the agency for
that purpose.' This, it held, was not prohibited by Bianchi since
Bianchi requires only that review be limited to the administrative
record and here there was no administrative record on the amount
of damages. It does not appear that much disagreement can be had
with this latter holding by the court.
26 The Court went on to emphasize its prohibition against the receipt of new
evidence. Should the administrative record before the court be defective or inadequate
or contain some prejudicial error, an evidentiary hearing still could not be held. Rather,
judgment might be granted to the contractor on the basis of the administrative record,
if warranted, or, if not so warranted, and the departmental decision could not be sus-
tained under the Wunderlich Act standards, the court could stay its proceedings pending
some further action before the department involved. "[If] . . the department failed
to remedy the particular substantive or procedural defect or inadequacy, the sanction
of judgment for the contractor would always be available to the 'court." 373 U.S. at
718.
20 32 U.S.L. Week 2050 (Ct. Cl. July 12, 1963). The case in the Court of
Claims was tried and the Commissioner's report filed before the Bianchi decision. On
the same day as the Stein decision, the court in Bar Ray Prods., Inc. v. United States,
Ct. Cl. No. 382-61 (July 12, 1963), returned the case to the Commissioner to determine
on the basis of the administrative record and the contract provisions whether the deci-
sion of the Board of Contract Appeals meets the Wunderlich Act standards.
27 Stein's claim for extra compensation for complying with the contract specifica-
tions as interpreted by the contracting officer was denied by the latter and the denial was
affirmed on appeal. Accordingly, no administrative action was taken to determine an
amount. Appeal of Stein Bros. Mfg. Co., A.S.B.C.A. No. 3870 (1958).
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Of perhaps more interest than the decision in Stein is the Memo-
randum of Law, submitted to the court by the Department of Justice,
discussing the impact of Bianchi on Stein and in general. The main
thrust of the government's argument is that all administrative deter-
minations of fact must be accorded finality under Wunderlich Act
standards and that no new evidence thereon may be received by the
court whether or not the facts so determined underlie a question of law,
a question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact. Thus, the govern-
ment would have the court put an end to its practice of dividing cases
into those in which the ultimate issue is one of fact and those in which
it is one of law and according finality to administrative determinations
of fact in the former while denying it in the latter. The Court of Claims
was not required to meet this problem in view of its basis for decision.
It did indicate, however, that it was not prepared to abandon the
distinction to which it has long adhered. The court stated that the
ultimate issue in Stein was one of law and not of fact and, accordingly,
it might not be precluded "by the Bianchi decision or, the Wunderlich
Act . . . from considering any evidence bearing on that legal issue, no
matter what the Board of Contract Appeals determined or what was in
the record before it."
In spite of its dictum on Stein it would appear that the
time has come for the Court of Claims to accord finality under
Wunderlich Act standards to all administrative determinations of
questions of fact in cases involving contracts containing a disputes
clause. The Supreme Court seems to have so decided in Bianchi."
Moreover no more reason appears, other than the somewhat legalistic
distinction between questions of fact and those of law, for according
finality in one case and not in the other. Where an administrative
hearing has been held and determinations of facts made, it would
appear that the orderly administration of government contracts and
of justice would not be served by rendering such hearing a nullity in
some cases on the basis of such a distinction. Unlike its approach, how-
ever, on administrative determinations of fact prior to Bianchi, where
it stood alone at odds with the United States Circuit and District Courts,
the Court of Claims is not without support in its division of cases into
those in which the ultimate question is one of law and those in which
it is one of fact.29 It is likely that the Court of Claims, notwithstanding
28 In its Memorandum of Law in the Stein case, the Department of Justice observed
that the Supreme Court commented that Bianchi did not argue that the underlying
controversy was beyond the scope of the disputes clause, a significant comment since
Bianchi did argue, both in its opposition to the petition for certiorari and in its brief
on the merits, that its claim involved questions of law and that therefore the taking of
evidence de novo should be sustained as proper.
29 Blake Constr. Co. v. United States, 296 F.2d 393 (D.C. Cir. 1961). See, how-
ever, McKinnon v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 913 (D. Ore. 1959) ; Allied Paint & Color
Works, Inc. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. N.Y. 1960); aff'd, 309 F.2d 133
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Bianchi, will adhere to the distinction when the question is presented
to it. A decision by the Supreme Court on this question has been sought
and certiorari has been granted.s° Meanwhile contractors in their own
best interests should present their entire case in every instance before
the administrative tribunal and not reserve evidence for the court. The
former may not prove to be just a way station.
(2d Cir. 1962) which would have questions of law decided on the administrative record
and not allow the introduction of new evidence because a question of law is involved.
80 Allied Paint & Color Works, Inc. v. United States, supra note 29.
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